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Unseen Face Presentation Attack Detection Using
Class-Specific Sparse One-Class Multiple Kernel
Fusion Regression
Shervin Rahimzadeh Arashloo
Abstract—The paper addresses face presentation attack detec-
tion in the challenging conditions of an unseen attack scenario
where the system is exposed to novel presentation attacks that
were not present in the training step. For this purpose, a pure
one-class face presentation attack detection approach based on
kernel regression is developed which only utilises bona fide
(genuine) samples for training. In the context of the proposed
approach, a number of innovations, including multiple kernel
fusion, client-specific modelling, sparse regularisation and proba-
bilistic modelling of score distributions are introduced to improve
the efficacy of the method. The results of experimental evaluations
conducted on the OULU-NPU, Replay-Mobile, Replay-Attack
and MSU-MFSD datasets illustrate that the proposed method
compares very favourably with other methods operating in an
unseen attack detection scenario while achieving very competitive
performance to multi-class methods (benefiting from presentation
attack data for training) despite using only bona fide samples for
training.
Index Terms—Face presentation attack detection, spoofing, un-
seen (novel) attacks, subject-specific modelling, novelty detection,
one-class classification, kernel regression, sparse regularisation,
multiple kernel fusion.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE functionality of face biometric systems in practicalsituations is compromised by their susceptibility to pre-
sentation attacks (PA’s) where an illegitimate trial is made to
get access to the system by presenting fake biometric traits
to system sensors. Due to potential security risks associated
with the problem, face presentation attack detection (a.k.a.
anti-spoofing) has received much attention over the past years,
resulting in a variety of countermeasures [1], [2]. A majority
of the existing approaches assume that the face PAD problem
is a closed-set recognition task and subsequently formulate and
train a binary classifier using the available positive (bona fide)
and negative (PA) training samples. Nevertheless, even with
the impressive performances reported on some databases, the
technology is not mature yet. The discrepancies in samples
due to varying image acquisition settings, including sensor
interoperability issues, different environmental conditions, etc.
degrade the performance of face PAD techniques. In this
context, a particularly challenging facet of the problem is
due to previously ”unseen” attack types for which no similar
training samples in terms of the presentation attack instruments
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are available at training time. In these situations, the common
closed-set two-class formulation of the problem tends to gen-
eralise poorly, degrading the performance of face PAD meth-
ods. While earlier benchmark datasets only included a single
attack type (typically printed paper), more recent databases
incorporate a more diverse set of attacks, including digital
photo attacks, replay attacks, mask attacks, make-up attacks,
etc. Although introducing new datasets [3], [4] that cover
a wider variety of possible presentation attack mechanisms
and instruments is desirable, yet, it may not completely solve
the problem. The limitation arises from the fact that not all
possible attack scenarios can be anticipated and covered in the
datasets since there is always the possibility of developing a
new attack strategy to bypass the existing countermeasures.
Consequently, error rates obtained on one or more datasets
cannot be generalised and regarded as representative error rates
corresponding to a real-world operation of the system.
In practice, presentation attacks may potentially appear as
fairly diverse, or novel and unpredictable while bona fide
sample distributions tend to have relatively less diversity.
Notwithstanding other strategies, an alternative approach to
the problem is to try to capture the distribution of bona
fide samples. This objective may be realised through a one-
class classification (OCC) approach to identify patterns from
a target class, conforming to a specific condition, and differ-
entiate them from non-target objects. OCC differs from the
conventional multi-class formulation in that it mainly relies
on samples from a single class for training. In the context of
biometric PAD, this approach has been examined, for instance,
in speech [5], fingerprint [6], or iris anti-spoofing [7] as well
as in face PAD [8], [9] by considering bona fide samples as
target objects and then trying to detect PA’s as anomalies w.r.t
the population of target observations. The merits of a one-class
strategy against the conventional binary-class formulation may
be outlined as follows:
• The multi-modal nature of presentation attack data com-
plicates learning an effective decision boundary as the
binary classifier, in this case, tries to associate a po-
tentially very diverse set of attack samples to a single
cluster/class. In contrast, since a one-class face PAD
method primarily utilises positive (bona fide) samples
for training, it would reduce the undesirable impacts of
the diversity of presentation attack data on performance.
In this respect, the difficulties associated with a sensible
choice of the negative (non-target) set common to the
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conventional binary techniques would be also avoided by
virtue of a one-class formulation.
• In a real-world scenario, attackers may devise inventive
ways to fool the system which may not have been avail-
able during the training stage of the PAD system. This
would in turn have an adverse impact on the performance
of the PAD sub-system as the two-class classifiers when
exposed to novel (unseen) attack types, tend to exhibit
poor generalisation performance. On the contrary, a one-
class method is expected to be able to naturally deal with
irregular (unknown) patterns by its inherent capability to
deal with never seen, non-target observations, and hence,
is better equipped to detect unknown presentation attacks.
• Training a two-class presentation attack detection system
requires both genuine as well as attack samples. While
collecting genuine access data is relatively easy, increas-
ing the number of presentation attack data for training
is more complicated and laborious. Hence, the design
of presentation attack detection systems based on a two-
class formulation may be affected by a class imbalance
problem. In contrast, in a one-class anomaly detection-
based approach it is relatively easier to extend the training
set as the decision boundary, in this case, is primarily
determined by single-class (i.e. bona fide) observations.
• The merits of using client-specific solutions over client-
independent models in biometrics have been explored in
different studies [10], [11], [12]. However, in the common
PAD formulations, the two-class learning scheme inhibits
the use of subject-specific solutions in open dataset
scenarios, as it is not viable to access subject-specific
presentation attack data at the enrolment stage. The
one-class formulation, by contrast, is readily amenable
to subject-specific model construction in open dataset
settings.
• During the operational course of a biometrics system
more samples would become available over time. A
common approach in this case is to utilise the thus
obtained samples to update the model. While the two-
class PAD systems may be not be able to effectively
benefit from such data to enhance the performance, a
pure anomaly detection-based formulation may readily
utilise such data as for training only positive samples are
required.
• And last but not least, from a general pattern classification
perspective, since a one-class formulation makes less
assumptions regarding the problem at hand, it tends
to have a higher capacity to cope with the problems
embedded in the nature of the data such as feature and
label noise, small sample size, contamination of the data,
etc.
In practice, based on the availability of training samples, dif-
ferent avenues may be followed to build a one-class classifier.
In this study, we conform to the strictest protocol, avoiding
the use of PA data altogether (zero-shot [13]) and design the
proposed approach in a pure anomaly detection framework
utilising only bona fide samples for training.
A. Contributions
The main contributions of the current work may be sum-
marised as follows:
1) Following a one-class pure anomaly detection formalism
and using only bona fide samples for system training, a
new approach to face PAD based on kernel regression
is presented. As only bona fide samples are used for
training, in the evaluation phase, the detection system is
naturally exposed to unseen attacks.
2) A sparse representation-based variant of the proposed
one-class face PAD approach is introduced where for
decision making at the operational phase, only a small
fraction of the bona fide training samples (as few as
5 frames) may be used, resulting in multiple orders of
speed-up gain with respect to its non-sparse counterpart.
3) A client-specific variant of the proposed face PAD
approach is introduced by training a separate model
for each individual client enrolled in the system. The
efficacy of the class-specific solution compared with
the client-independent scheme (applying a single global
model to detect PA’s against all subjects) is validated on
different datasets.
4) In the context of the proposed sparse subject-specific
one-class model for face PAD, we present a multiple
kernel fusion anomaly detection scheme to combine the
complementary information provided by different views
of the problem for improved detection performance.
5) In terms of the proposed approach, it is illustrated
that using generic pre-trained off-the-shelf deep CNN
models, it is possible to obtain state-of-the-art perfor-
mance, even in the challenging conditions of ”unseen”
presentation attacks.
6) While the proposed approach is applicable to each indi-
vidual frame in isolation, in order to derive a consensus
decision for an entire video sequence, we examine two
procedures. The first one applies a mean fusion rule over
raw scores corresponding to individual frames. The other
assumes a mean fusion over a probabilistic measure of
normality. Both alternatives are illustrated to be effective
in improving detection performance for a video sequence
compared with a single frame.
7) And, lastly, a thorough evaluation of the proposed face
PAD approach is carried out on four publicly available
datasets in an unseen (zero-shot) presentation attack
detection scenario (not utilizing any presentation attack
data for training), demonstrating the competitive perfor-
mance of the proposed approach against other one-class
as well as multi-class face PAD techniques.
B. Organisation
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section II
reviews related work with an emphasis on unseen face PAD
approaches. In Section III, some background material on linear
regression and its extension to the reproducing kernel Hilbert
space is provided. In Section IV, the proposed one-class
approach for unseen face PAD is introduced where sparse reg-
ularisation of the solution, client-specific model construction,
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multiple kernel fusion, frame and video-level decision making
are discussed. The results of an experimental evaluation of the
proposed approach are presented and discussed in Section V.
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Different countermeasures including hardware-based,
software-based and challenge-response methods [14] have
been proposed for face presentation attack detection. The
software-based approaches try to classify an image (sequence)
based on different features derived from image content. In
this study, we follow a software-based approach to face PAD
using a single modality (i.e. visible spectrum RGB images)
for PA detection in contrast to some other studies operating
beyond the visible spectrum [15]. Among the cues conveyed
by an image/image sequence for face PAD including texture,
motion, frequency, colour, shape or reflectance, texture is
the most commonly used feature for face PAD [16], [17].
Deployment of texture for face PAD is partly fuelled by the
assumption that face PA’s introduce certain texture patterns
that do not occur in bona fide samples. A different category
of face PAD methods constitutes motion-based approaches
considering either intra-face variations [18], [19] or analysing
the consistency of a subject’s motion with the environment
[20]. A alternative category of approaches corresponds to
frequency-based methods to discern image artefacts in the
Fourier domain either from a single image [21] or from an
image sequence [22], [20]. Colour characteristics [23], [24]
as well as shape information are also employed as different
cues to deal with presentation attacks [25]. Motivated by the
assumption that bona fide and PA attempts behave differently
under the same illumination conditions, some other methods
[26] use reflectance for face PAD. Other work [27] focuses
on using a statistical model of image noise for face PAD. A
recent category of approaches corresponds to deep learning
methods. Inspired by the successful of such models, and in
particular, deep convolutional neural networks (CNN’s) in
different image analysis applications, different methods have
been proposed to utilise the discriminatory information of
deep CNN representations for face PAD [28], [29], [30].
In terms of the two-class classifiers used for decision mak-
ing, different alternatives have been examined. These include
discriminant classifiers with the Support Vector Machines
being the most frequently used approach [31], [32]. Other
classifiers following a discriminative procedure include the
linear discriminant analysis [23], [33], neural networks [19],
convolutional neural networks [28], [29], Bayesian networks
[34] as well as Adaboost [35]. An alternative category includes
regression-based approaches trying to project input features
onto their labels [36]. Methods trying to learn a distance metric
[37] also exist in the literature. Some heuristics have been also
examined for classification in face PAD [18], [38].
In contrary to the common close-set two-class formulation
of the problem, there also exists a different category of
approaches trying to address the face PAD problem in an
unseen attack scenario where in the evaluation phase, the
system is exposed to PA’s which were not available during the
training stage of the system. One main group of these methods
formulates the problem as an OCC problem to detect unseen
PA’s [8]. In our earlier study [8], a new evaluation protocol
as well as a one-class formulation of the face PAD problem
based on the anomaly detection concept was presented where
the training data came from the positive class only. The eval-
uation and comparison of 20 different one-class and two-class
methods on different databases illustrated that in the presence
of unseen PA’s, one-class formalism may be considered as a
promising direction for investigation. Other work following a
one-class formulation [9] considers a Gaussian mixture model
(GMM) one-class learner for classification operating on image
quality measures. Other work [39], analyses One-Class SVM
and AutoEncoder-based classifiers to address unseen face
PAD. Both approaches, together with the Local Binary Pattern
feature are evaluated and compared on four face PAD datasets.
The study in [40] examined a new strategy to utilise the
client-specific information to train one-class classifiers using
only bona fide data. It was found that one-class classifiers
trained with client-specific information appeared to be more
robust to unseen PA’s compared to client-independent and
multi-class methods. In an alternative study [13], detection
of unknown PA’s was addressed in a Zero-Shot Face Anti-
spoofing (ZSFA) scenario via a deep tree network (DTN)
to partition the PA samples into semantic sub-groups in an
unsupervised fashion. Upon the arrival of new a sample,
whether known or unknown in terms of attack type, DTN
routes it to the most similar PA cluster to make a binary
decision. The work in [41] introduces a method where a deep
metric learning model is proposed using a triplet focal loss as
regularisation for the so-called metric-softmax approach. The
benefits of the proposed deep anomaly detection architecture
were demonstrated by introducing a few-shot a posteriori
probability estimation mechanism.
For a more detailed review of the face PAD methods one
may consult [1], [42], [2].
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, a brief background on linear regression and
its extension to the reproducing kernel Hilbert space (kernel
regression) shall be provided. In Section IV, kernel regression
is developed as a tool for face PA anomaly detection.
A. Linear Regression
Let us assume there exists a set of points x1, . . . , xn
in a d-dimensional space, i.e. xi ∈ Rd, collected into the
matrix Xn×d which are to be projected onto the real numbers
y1, . . . , yn, i.e. yi ∈ R, collectively represented as vector
yn×1. A commonly followed approach to the problem above is
that of linear least squares regression [43] where one assumes
that the responses yi’s are generated through a linear process
g(xi) = α
>xi and then tries to estimate α by minimising a
sum of squared errors:
αopt = argmin
α
(Xα− y)>(Xα− y) (1)
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The solution to the problem above may be found by taking
the derivative of the cost function (Xα−y)>(Xα−y) w.r.t.
α and setting it to zero which yields
α = (X>X)−1X>y (2)
Given α, function g(.) at an arbitrary point z may then be
evaluated as
g(z) = α>z = y>X(X>X)−1z = y>(XX>)−1Xz
= [〈z, x1〉, . . . , 〈z, xn〉](XX>)−1y (3)
where 〈., .〉 denotes inner (dot) product and .> represents the
transpose operation.
B. Kernel Regression
Let F be a feature space induced by a non-linear mapping
φ : Rd → F . For a suitably chosen mapping, an inner product
〈., .〉 on F may be represented as 〈φ(xi),φ(xj)〉 = κ(xi, xj),
where κ(., .) is a positive semi-definite kernel function. In
kernel regression, each point x is first projected onto φ(x)
followed by seeking a real-valued function g(φ(x)) = f(x)
minimising a sum of squared differences between the expected
and the generated responses. Using Eq. 3, the relation for f(z)
may be written as
f(z) = [〈φ(z), φ(x1)〉, . . . , 〈φ(z), φ(xn)〉](φ(X)φ(X)>)−1y
= [κ(z, x1), . . . κ(z, xn)]K
−1y (4)
where we have used the notation K = φ(X)φ(X)> to denote
the so-called kernel matrix. Denoting α = K−1y, function
f(.) may be represented as
f(.) = [κ(., x1), . . . κ(., xn)]α
=
n∑
i=1
αiκ(., xi) (5)
The full responses on the training set X may be derived as
f(X) = Kα and the corresponding cost function in this case
is ‖Kα− y‖2 where ‖.‖2 denotes L2-norm.
IV. KERNEL REGRESSION FOR ONE-CLASS FACE PAD
In a one-class classification task, it is desirable to have
normal samples forming a compact cluster while being distant
from anomalies. In a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS)
and in the absence of outlier training data, in a one-class
classification paradigm, it is common practice to consider the
origin as an artificial exemplar outlier with respect to the
distribution of positive samples [44].
In this work, a projection function (defined in terms of
kernel regression) is sought such that it maps bona fide
samples onto a compact cluster, distant from a hypothetical
non-target observation lying at the origin. This objective may
be achieved by setting the responses for all target observations
to a common fixed real number, distinct from zero, i.e. yi = c,
for all i, s.t. c 6= 0. In this case, the kernel regression
approach would form a compact cluster of target samples
as they would be all mapped onto the same point. Note
that kernel regression performs an exact interpolation when
the parameters characterising the regression (i.e. α) can be
uniquely determined which is the case when the kernel matrix
is positive-definite. Since by assumption c 6= 0, the projected
normal observations would lie away from the (hypothetical)
outlier, i.e. the origin. Without loss of generality one may set
c = 1, as the exact value for c would only act as a scaling
factor. Having set the response vector y to 1n×1, one may
solve for α as α = K−1y = K−11n×1.
The procedure discussed above provides the best separabil-
ity of normal samples from outliers with respect to the Fisher
criterion, stated formally in the following theorem.
Theorem Assuming the origin as a hypothetical outlier, the
kernel regression approach with the responses for all target
samples set to a common fixed real number other than zero,
yields a zero within-class scatter while providing a positive
between-class scatter, and thus corresponds to the optimal
kernel Fisher criterion for classification, i.e. kernel Fisher
null-space.
Proof In a Fisher classifier, the criterion function to be
maximised is
J =
ϕ>sBϕ
ϕ>sWϕ
(6)
where sB is the between-class scatter matrix, sW stands for
the within-class scatter matrix and ϕ denotes one axis of the
subspace. For the two-category case, the Fisher criterion may
be equivalently written as the ratio of the between-class scatter
to the total within-class scatter as [43]
J =
sB
sW
=
(m1 −m2)2
s21 + s
2
2
(7)
where m1 and m2 stand for the means of the two classes while
s21 and s
2
2 represent the corresponding within-class scatters.
As noted earlier, the Fisher analysis, originally developed for
a binary classification problem, may be applied to the one-
class scenario by assuming the origin as an exemplar outlier.
In this case, the within-class scatter of the transformed bona
fide samples is
s21 =
∑
C1
(yi −m1)2 = y>y − 1
n
y>1n×ny (8)
where C1 denotes the target class while yi denotes the pro-
jection of sample xi ∈ C1 onto an optimal feature subspace
and m1 stands for the mean of the positive class. y is a vector
collection of the responses for transformed data points of the
target class while n denotes the number of bona fide samples.
As for the negative (presentation attack) class, it is assumed
that only a single hypothetical sample exists at the origin, thus
m2 = 0 and s2 = 0. The total within-class scatter in this case
would then be sW = s21 + s
2
2 = s
2
1.
Regarding the between-class scatter (numerator of J in Eq.
7) we have
sB = (m1 −m2)2 = ( 1
n
n∑
i=1
yi − 0)2 = 1
n2
y>1n×ny (9)
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As it is assumed that all target observations are mapped onto 1,
by substituting y = (1, . . . , 1)> in the relation for the within-
class scatter one obtains
sW |y=(1,...,1)> = y>y −
1
n
y>1n×ny = 0 (10)
Using y = (1, . . . , 1)>, the between-class scatter may be
derived as
sB |y=(1,...,1)> =
1
n2
y>1n×ny = 1 (11)
Thus, the one-class kernel regression when the responses of
all target (bona fide) samples are equal and distinct from
zero, corresponds to a projection function (i.e. f(.)) leading
to sW = 0 and sB = 1, and consequently, represents a kernel
Fisher null-space analysis [45], [46]. 
The foregoing kernel regression-based classification ap-
proach may be considered as a one-class novelty detection
variant of our earlier study [47] introduced for face PAD and
that of [10] previously developed for face verification.
A. Regularisation
Formulating a one-class classifier based on the kernel
regression formalism opens the possibility to regularise the
solution. Regularising the solution of a regression problem
may be driven by different objectives. The first case where
regularisation may be applied is when the number of observa-
tions is smaller than the number of variables which makes
the least-squares problem ill-posed. In this case, regulari-
sation introduces additional constraints to uniquely specify
the solution. The second case is when the model suffers
from poor generalisation performance. In these circumstances,
regularisation serves to improve the generalisation capability
of the model by imposing a limitation on the available function
space by introducing a penalty to discourage certain regions
of the solution space. In such cases, regularisation corresponds
to priors on the solution to maintain a trade-off between data
fidelity and some constraint on the solution.
A regularised kernel regression problem may be expressed
as finding the vector minimser of the following cost function:
P (α) = ‖Kα− y‖2 +R(α) (12)
where, as before, ‖Kα − y‖2 measures the closeness of the
generated responses to the expected responses y while R(α)
encodes a desired regularisation on the solution α.
Regularisation schemes favouring sparseness of the solution
to derive the simplest possible explanation of an observation
in terms of as few as possible atoms from a dictionary are
among the widely applied techniques [48]. Sparsity of the
solution to a least squares problem may be encouraged via
an L1-norm, the thus obtained problem being known as a
basis pursuit in signal processing and Lasso in statistics. In
addition to enhanced generalisation performance, sparse L1-
norm models lead to scalable algorithms that can be applied
to problems with a large number of parameters. In this work,
encouraging sparseness of the solution of the one-class kernel
regression is realised by prescribing an L1-regulariser on α,
i.e. R(α) = δ∑ni=1 |αi|. The objective function for the sparse
one-class kernel regression may then be expressed as
P (α) = ‖Kα− y‖2 + δ
n∑
i=1
|αi| (13)
where parameter δ controls the trade-off between data fidelity
and sparseness of the solution. By imposing a strong sparse-
ness prior on α, each response yi would be characterised by
only a few samples from among the training set, an important
implication of which is a reduction in the computational cost
of the algorithm in the operational stage.
B. Class-Specific Modelling
The common methodology in the literature for face PAD is
to learn a single classifier applicable to all samples, ignoring
the identity information. In other words, the PAD sub-system is
typically designed in a client-independent fashion. The client-
independent design scheme rests on the (implicit) assump-
tion that the class label (bona fide/PA) of an observation
is independent of the client identity. The client-independent
formalism has been re-evaluated in different studies [49],
[40], [50] where it has been observed that utilisation of
subject-specific information leads to significant improvements
in detection performance. Some other work utilising subject-
specific information include [36] and [51]. More specifically,
in a class-specific one-class approach for face PAD, one tries to
determine what is anomalous with respect to a specific subject
as opposed to the class-independent formulation where the
goal is to decide what is an outlier in general, irrespective
of any specific identity. Training a client-specific face PAD
model, however, necessitates subject identities to be accessible
both during the training as well as the operational phase
of the system. As discussed in [49], such information is
readily available to a face PAD engine as it works alongside
a face recognition system. As such, in the training phase, the
enrolment data associated with each client may be employed
to build a subject-specific PAD model. In the operational phase
of a face verification system, a test subject claims an identity,
while in an identification scenario, the test sample is com-
pared against multiple models stored in the database, whose
identities are already known. In both operational modes, the
identity of the target class is known and may be deployed by
the PAD sub-system to compare a test observation against the
model of a specific client. Our earlier study [40], examining
a client-specific one-class approach validated the merits of
incorporating subject-specific information for the face PAD
problem.
Driven by these observations, the current work advocates a
client-specific one-class kernel regression approach to the face
PAD problem. More specifically, in the present study, during
the training phase, a separate one-class kernel regression
classifier is built for each subject using the corresponding bona
fide data while in the operational stage, the test sample is
matched against a subject-specific model.
C. Multiple Kernel Fusion
The kernel function plays an important role in kernel-based
methods as it specifies the embedding of the data in the
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fig. 1: Multiple regions used to derive local face representa-
tions. (a): image obtained from face detection; (b): region R1;
(c): region R2; (d): region R3; (e): region R4.
feature space. While ideally the embedding is to be learnt
directly from training samples, in practice, a relaxed version
of the problem is considered by trying to learn an optimal
combination of multiple kernels providing different views
of the problem at hand. The coefficients characterising the
combination may then be learnt using training instances from
multiple classes [52]. In a one-class novelty detection approach
and in the absence of non-target (PA) training samples (i.e.
unseen face PAD), we opt for the average fusion of multiple
base kernels. In this context, diverse views of the face PAD
problem are constructed following two mechanisms: use of
multiple (local) face image regions and deployment of multiple
representations derived from these regions, discussed next.
1) Multiple Regions: In addition to the whole face image
providing discriminatory information at a global level, differ-
ent local regions of the face image convey distinct information
for decision making while introducing diversity and providing
the possibility to identify facial parts which possess face PA
characteristics. In order to benefit from local information,
along with the whole face image cropped tightly from face
detection bounding box to minimise the background effects
(identified as region 1), three additional local regions are also
considered. These include eyes and nose as region 2, the areas
surrounding the nose as region3 and region 4 which focuses
on the areas surrounding the nose and the mouth, Fig. 1.
2) Multiple Image Representation: The second source of
diversity for multiple kernel fusion is derived through using
different image representations. While a wide range of dif-
ferent image features including LBP and its variants [53],
[10], image quality measures [53], [9], etc. are applied to
face PAD, more recently, a great deal of research has been
directed towards investigating the applicability of deep convo-
lutional neural network (CNN) representations for face PAD
[30] illustrating that such features may provide discrimina-
tive information for detection of presentation attacks. The
application of CNN-based representation may also simplify
the overall design architecture of biometric systems through
adoption of common representation for the face matching
problem. Following the same methodology, the current study
utilises CNN representations as features for face PAD. For
this purpose, features obtained from the penultimate layers of
pre-trained GoogleNet [54], ResNet50 [55] and VGG16 [56]
networks are used to construct multiple representations for
each facial region.
3) Learning the discriminant: Once multiple representa-
tions from different regions are derived, the learning process of
the proposed subject-specific sparse one-class multiple kernel
fusion regression approach for subject c is given as
αc = argmin
α
‖ 1
RN
(
R∑
r=1
N∑
n=1
Kcrn)α− y‖2 + δ
n∑
i=1
|αi| (14)
where R = 4 and N = 3 denote the number of facial regions
and deep CNN networks used for face image representation,
respectively while Kcrn stands for the kernel matrix associated
with region r whose representation is obtained via CNN with
index n. In a subject-specific approach, the kernel matrices
Kcrn’s are constructed by using the training instances (i.e.
features extracted from bona fide frames) of subject c only. In
this study, Eq. 14, is solved using the Least Angle Regression
(LARS) algorithm [57] which facilitates deriving solutions
with all possible cardinalities on α.
D. Decision Strategy
Once the projection parameter αc is inferred for client c,
the projection of a test sample (z) onto the feature subspace
of subject c is given as
f c(z) =
M∑
i=1
αci (
1
RN
R∑
r=1
N∑
n=1
κrn(z,x
c
i )) (15)
where αci denotes the i
th (non-zero) element of the discrimi-
nant in the Hilbert space for the cth subject while xci denotes
the ith training instance of subject c. M is the total number
of non-zero elements of α. κrn(z,xci ) is the kernel function,
capturing the similarity between the rth region of the test
sample z and that of the ith training instance of subject c
based on the representation derived through the nth deep CNN
network.
1) Raw score fusion: Eq. 15 provides the raw projection
score for a single frame of a test video sequence. In order
to derive a score for the whole test video, one possibility is
to simply average the raw scores corresponding to individual
frames comprising the video, leading to a decision rule as
1
F
F∑
f=1
f c(zf ) ≥ τ c bona fide
1
F
F∑
f=1
f c(zf ) < τ
c PA
(16)
where F denotes the total number of frames in a video
sequence while τ c is the threshold for decision making for
subject c.
2) Fusion of probabilistic scores: Next, we approximate
the probability density function of the score distributions cor-
responding to bona fide samples using a Gaussian function and
use the cumulative density function of the inferred Gaussian as
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a probabilistic measure of normality. In this case, the decision
rule for a video sequence reads
1
F
F∑
f=1
∫ zf
−∞
Nµ,σ(zf ) ≥ τ c bona fide
1
F
F∑
f=1
∫ zf
−∞
Nµ,σ(zf ) < τ c PA
(17)
where Nµ,σ denotes a normal distribution with mean µ and
standard deviation σ.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, the results of an experimental evaluation of
the proposed approach on four publicly available datasets in
an ”unseen” attack scenario are presented. Once the imple-
mentation details and the performance metrics are discussed,
the requirements for a dataset to be used in a client-specific
modelling are outlined. The discussion is then followed by a
brief description of the datasets employed in this study. Next,
the effects of multiple kernel fusion, client-specific modelling,
sparse regularisation and temporal aggregation are presented.
Finally, the proposed approach is compared with the state-
of-the-art methods in different scenarios. While the proposed
approach operates in a zero-shot (unseen attack) scenario, we
provide comparisons against other methods which operate in
an unseen attack scenario (where no attack data is used for
training) as well as multi-class approaches where both bona
fide and attack samples are utilise for training.
A. Implementation Details
A number of details regarding implementation of the pro-
posed approach are in order. Each frame is initially pre-
processed using the photometric normalisation method of [58]
to compensate for illumination variations. The face detection
bounding boxes provided along with each dataset are used
to locate the face in each frame where in the case of a
missing bounding box for a frame, the coordinates of the last
detected face in the corresponding video sequence is used. In
order to select facial regions (Fig. 1) in a consistent fashion
across different frames, the OpenFace library [59] is used to
detect landmarks around facial features. For the extraction of
deep CNN representations, their implementations in MATLAB
are used, yielding 1024-, 2048- and 4096-dimensional feature
vectors for GoogLenet (N1), ResNet50 (N2) and VGG16 (N3),
respectively. The thus obtained feature vectors are normalised
to have a unit L2-norm. The kernel function used is that of a
Gaussian (i.e. κ(xi, z) = exp(−θ‖xi − z‖2) kernel yielding a
positive definite kernel matrix where θ is set to the reciprocal
of the average Euclidean distance between bona fide training
samples.
B. Database Requirements for Client-Specific Modelling
While different datasets are available for the evaluation of
face PAD methods, we have chosen four datasets for evaluation
of the proposed approach in an unseen PAD scenario. The
criteria for this selection not only include presence of different
PA instruments, different illumination conditions, different
acquisition devices, but also: 1) availability of data for subject-
specific model construction, as well as 2) availability of a
relatively large number of evaluation results of other face PAD
techniques in an unseen scenario for comparison. Regarding
the first requirement, one should note that the majority of
the existing databases lack a dedicated separate enrolment
set of data for subject-specific training. This requirement
rules out the possibility to use some data sets including the
SiW, SiW-M and other datasets [3], [26], [4] in the context
of a client-specific modelling approach. The few exceptions
are the Replay-Attack [60], Replay-Mobile [61] and OULU-
NPU datasets [62]. While in the Replay-Attack and Replay-
Attack datasets a separate enrolment set is provided, the most
challenging protocol of the OULU-NPU database (protocol 4)
is defined in a way that allows for client-specific modelling.
Considering the second criterion for database selection, one
notices that a relatively large number of unseen face PAD
evaluation results are available on the MSU-MFSD dataset
[63].
C. Datasets
The datasets used in the current work are briefly introduced
next.
1) The Replay-Mobile dataset: The Replay-Mobile dataset
[61] includes 1190 video recordings of both bona fide and
attack samples of 40 individuals recorded under different
illumination conditions using two different acquisition devices.
Five different lighting conditions are considered for recording
bona fide access attempts. In order to produce the presentation
attacks, high-resolution photos and videos from each subjects
are captured under two different illumination conditions. The
dataset is divided into three disjoint subsets of training, devel-
opment and testing and an additional partition corresponding
to enrolment data. The training set contains 120 bona fide and
192 attack samples while the development set incorporates 160
real-accesses and 256 attacks. The test set is comprised of 110
bona fide videos and 192 presentation attacks. The enrolment
set includes 160 bona fide video recordings.
2) The Replay-Attack dataset: The Replay-Attack database
[60] includes 1300 video recordings of bona fide and attack
samples of 50 different individuals. The videos are captured
under two different illumination and background conditions.
Attacks are created either using a printed image, a mobile
phone or a high definition iPad screen. The video recordings in
this database are divided randomly into three subject-disjoint
subsets for training (60 bona fide and 300 PA samples),
development (60 bona fide and 300 PA samples) and testing
(80 bona fide and 400 PA samples) purposes. In addition to the
training, development and test sets, the Replay-Attack database
comes with an extra set of videos recorded in a separate
session to serve as enrolment data for each of the 50 clients.
3) The OULU-NPU dataset: The OULU-NPU database
[62] consists of 4950 bona fide and attack video recordings of
55 subjects recorded using six different cameras in three ses-
sions with different illumination conditions and backgrounds.
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The dataset includes previously unseen input sensors, attack
types and acquisition conditions. The videos of the 55 subjects
in this database are divided into three subject-disjoint subsets
for training (360 bona fide and 1440 PA samples), development
(270 bona fide and 1080 PA samples) and testing (360 bona
fide and 1440 PA samples) purposes. For the evaluation
purposes, four protocols are designed amongst which, the forth
protocol is the most challenging one as in this protocol the
evaluation is performed against previously unseen illumination
conditions and background scenes, attacks and input sensors.
As the test set of the forth evaluation protocol is comprised of
samples corresponding to the third session, in order to build
client-specific models, the videos from other two sessions may
be used.
4) The MSU-MFSD dataset: The MSU MFSD database
[63] includes 440 videos of photo and video attack attempts
of 55 individuals recorded using two different cameras. The
publicly available subset, however, includes 35 subjects. The
dataset is divided into two subject-disjoint sets for training
(30 bona fide and 90 PA’s) and testing (40 bona fide and 120
PA’s) purposes. While for the previous three datasets there
exists independent bona fide data for subject-specific model
construction, in this dataset, no such data exists. Thus, for the
construction of class-specific models on this dataset, we use
5% of the bona fide data (roughly corresponding to 26 frames
per subject) for training and the remaining 95% for testing
purposes.
D. Performance Metrics
For performance reporting ISO metrics BSISO-IEC30107-
3-2017 are used in this study [64]. These are: 1) attack presen-
tation classification error rate (APCER) which represents the
proportion of attack presentations using the same PA instru-
ment species incorrectly classified as bona fide presentations;
and, 2) bona fide presentation classification error rate (BPCER)
which corresponds to proportion of bona fide presentations
incorrectly classified as PA’s. When considering how well a
PAD subsystem performs in detecting PA’s, the APCER of
the most successful PA instrument species (PAIS) is reported:
APCER = max
PAIS
(APCERPAIS) (18)
More specifically, the APCER is computed separately for each
presentation attack instrument (e.g. display or print) and the
overall presentation attack detection performance corresponds
to the most successful attack, i.e. the attack with the highest
APCER.
In order to summarised the overall performance of the PAD
subsystem as a single number, the Average Classification Error
Rate (ACER) defined as the average of the APCER and the
BPCER at a specific decision threshold (the threshold where
the false rejection rate (FRR) and the false acceptance rate
(FAR) are balanced) may be used:
ACER =
maxPAIS(APCERPAIS) +BPCER
2
(19)
The ACER measure has been deprecated and would be used
in here for the sake of completeness and in order to enable a
comparison between our results to some other approaches.
TABLE I: Effect of Multiple Kernel Fusion in terms of ACER
(%). R.M.:Replay-Mobile; R.A.: Replay-Attack; M.M.: MSU-
MFSD; O.N.: OULU-NPU; All: average over all datasets.
Kernel R.M. R.A. M.M. O.N. All
R1N1 20.00 3.33 0.04 13.75 9.28
R2N1 15.23 3.12 0.04 10.42 7.20
R3N1 18.18 8.13 0.04 7.50 8.46
R4N1 18.41 8.12 0.04 9.17 8.93
R1N2 30.45 1.67 0.04 11.25 10.85
R2N2 25.68 0.21 0.04 25.42 12.83
R3N2 18.64 0.21 0.04 20.42 9.82
R4N2 19.09 0 0.04 12.08 7.80
R1N3 20.45 0.42 0.04 10.42 7.83
R2N3 24.55 0 0.04 8.33 8.23
R3N3 18.64 0.42 0.04 11.67 7.69
R4N3 19.90 0.63 0.04 7.50 7.01
Fusion 15.68 0 0 6.67 5.58
In addition to the ISO metrics, the performance of the
proposed approach is also reported in terms of the Area Under
the ROC Curve (AUC) as well as the Half Total Error Rate
(HTER) and the Equal Error Rate (EER), whenever required
for a comparison to other techniques.
E. Effect of Multiple Kernel Fusion
First, the effect of fusing multiple views of the problem
via a kernel fusion strategy is analysed. For this purpose and
in order to summarise the performance of each individual
kernel to facilitate a comparison, ACER’s corresponding to
different facial regions and different CNN representations
are reported in Table I where RxNy denotes the represen-
tation for region x ∈ {1, . . . , 4} derived from deep CNN
y ∈ {GoogLenet, ResNet50, VGG16}. From the table, the
following observations may be made. First, the best perform-
ing regional representation among others in terms of average
ACER is R4N3 (i.e. VGG16 applied to the region focusing on
the areas surrounding the nose and the mouth). Interestingly,
the performance of R4 is better than the whole face image (R1)
using the same deep CNN representation. Second, among three
different deep representations one observes that the VGG16
network provides the most discriminative features for presen-
tation attack detection. Third, regardless of the region and
the deep CNN features employed, the Replay-Mobile and the
OULU-NPU (forth protocol) appear to be more challenging
as compared with other datasets. In terms of the kernel fusion
strategy, the average ACER for the fusion is 5.58% whereas
the best performing single kernel provides an average ACER
of 7.01% while the worst performing kernel yields an average
ACER of 12.83%. That is, the kernel fusion improves the
average ACER w.r.t. the best single kernel by more than 20%
and by more than 56% w.r.t. the worst performing single
kernel.
F. Effect of Client-Specific Modelling
In this section, the efficacy of subject-specific modelling
compared to the subject-independent scheme is investigated.
In the client-specific approach, a separate one-class kernel
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TABLE II: Effect of Client-Specific Modelling in terms
of ACER (%). R.M.:Replay-Mobile; R.A.: Replay-Attack;
M.M.: MSU-MFSD; O.N.: OULU-NPU; All: average over all
datasets.
R.M. R.A. M.M. O.N. All
Client-Independent 24.77 4.60 3.75 43.33 19.11
Client-Specific 15.68 0.0 0.0 6.67 5.58
regression classifier is built for each subject and subsequently
used for decision making. In contrast, in the class-independent
approach, a single one-class classifier applicable to all subjects
enrolled into the dataset is trained. The performances of the
two different approaches in terms of ACER are reported
in Table II. From the table, it may be observed that on
all four datasets, the client-specific modelling improves the
performance. While on the Replay-Attack and MSU-MFSD
datasets the client-specific modelling leads to perfect detection
performance (zero ACER’s), on the Replay-Mobile dataset,
it leads to more than 36% improvement in terms of the
ACER. The reduction in the error rate on the OULU-NPU
dataset is even larger; While the client-independent approach
yields an ACER of 43.33% on this dataset, the subject-
specific methodology provides an ACER of 6.67%. That is,
a tremendous improvement of more than 84% is achieved. In
terms of the average ACER on the four datasets, the subject-
independent approach yields an ACER of 19.11% while the
ACER corresponding to the class-specific approach is 5.58%,
amounting to 70% improvement in ACER, on average.
G. Effect of Sparse Regularisation
Next, we examine the effectiveness of sparse regularisation
on the one-class kernel regression approach. For this purpose,
using the LARS algorithm [57], solutions (α) with different
cardinalities (number of non-zero elements) of 2, 3, 4, 5, 10,
20, 30 and 50 are obtained. Cardinalities of higher than 50
are found not to improve the overall average ACER. The
performances corresponding to different cases in terms of
ACER are reported in Table III. The last column of the table
(ARSG), reports the Average Relative Speed-up Gain achieved
compared to the non-sparse solution in the test phase. From the
table, it may be observed that, interestingly, even by using 2
training frames, one may achieve an impressive overall average
ACER of 8.10%. Increasing the cardinality from 2 towards 5,
a reduction in the average ACER over four datasets is achieved
where by using only 5 bona fide training frames, the proposed
approach yields an average ACER of 5.58%. Increasing the
cardinality beyond 5 towards 50, no further improvement in
terms of the ACER is obtained. In terms of ARSG, it may be
observed that the best performing method in terms of average
ACER with NNZ=5 (NNZ: Number of Non-Zero elements in
α), yields an impressive 160× speed-up gain compared to the
non-sparse solution.
H. Effect of Temporal Aggregation
In this section, the effect of temporal aggregation of frame-
level scores to derive a video-level decision using a sum
TABLE III: Effect of Sparsity in terms of ACER (%). NNZ:
number of non-zero elements of α ; R.M.: Replay-Mobile;
R.A.: Replay-Attack; M.M.: MSU-MFSD; O.N.: OULU-NPU;
All: average over all datasets; ARSG: average relative speed
up gain.
NNZ R.M. R.A. M.M. O.N. All ARSG
2 21.36 0.0 5.63 5.42 8.10 ≈ 390×
3 18.86 0.0 0.0 5.83 6.17 ≈ 260×
4 17.50 0.0 0.0 6.67 6.04 ≈ 200×
5 15.68 0.0 0.0 6.67 5.58 ≈ 160×
10 16.14 0.0 0.0 7.50 5.91 ≈ 80×
20 15.68 0.0 0.0 9.17 6.21 ≈ 40 ×
30 15.23 0.0 0.0 9.17 6.10 ≈ 25×
50 15.23 0.0 0.0 10.0 6.30 ≈ 15×
TABLE IV: Effect of Temporal Aggregation in terms of ACER
(%). R.M.:Replay-Mobile; R.A.: Replay-Attack; M.M.: MSU-
MFSD; O.N.: OULU-NPU; All: average over all datasets.
R.M. R.A. M.M. O.N. All
Frame-Level 15.92 1.91 4.01 14.14 8.99
Video-Level (raw) 15.68 0.0 0.0 6.67 5.58
Video-Level (prob.) 13.64 0.0 0.0 6.25 4.97
fusion rule over raw scores and over probabilistic scores is
analysed. The frame-level and video-level performances of
the proposed approach on different datasets along with the
average ACER’s are reported in Table IV. From the table it
may be observed that the sum fusion over raw scores (Video-
level (raw)) improves the average ACER on four datasets
from 8.99% to 5.58%. That is, more than 37% reduction in
the average ACER. The average fusion rule applied to the
probabilistic scores yields an even further reduction in the
average ACER, from 5.58% to 4.97%, corresponding to more
than 10% improvement.
I. Comparison to Other Methods
In this section, the performance of the proposed sparse one-
class kernel fusion regression approach (NNZ=5) is compared
against other methods on four datasets. Note that the proposed
approach does not utilise any samples for training (i.e. operates
in a zero-shot attack scenario). Nevertheless, we provide
comparisons between the proposed method and both one-class
as well as multi-class approaches.
In addition to other existing face PAD techniques in the lit-
erature, in order to provide further baseline performances and
enable a more critical assessment of the proposed technique,
three other kernel-based one-class classifiers are included
for comparison. These are Support Vector Data Description
(SVDD) [65], Kernel Principal Component Analysis (KPCA)
[66] and the Gaussian Process (GP) [67]. For a fair compar-
ison, kernel matrices are computed and shared between the
proposed method and the other three kernel-based one-class
approaches.
1) OULU-NPU: The results of a comparison between the
proposed approach and some other methods on the fourth pro-
tocol of the OULU-NPU dataset are reported in Table V. From
the table, it may be observed that the average ACER of the
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TABLE V: Comparison of the performance of the proposed
approach to other methods (including multi-class methods) on
protocol 4 of the OULU-NPU dataset. (SVDD, KPCA and GP
benefit from the same multiple kernel fusion strategy as that
of this work.)
Method APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER (%)
Massy HNU [68] 35.8±35.3 8.3±4.1 22.1±17.6
GRADIANT[68] 5.0±4.5 15.0±7.1 10.0±5.0
FAS-BAS[3] 9.3±5.6 10.4±6.0 9.5±6.0
LBP-SVM[53] 41.67±27.03 55.0±21.21 48.33±6.07
IQM-SVM[53] 34.17±25.89 39.17±23.35 36.67±12.13
DeepPixBiS[53] 36.67±29.67 13.33±16.75 25.0±12.67
SVDD 25.0±17.32 8.33±6.83 16.67±10.68
KPCA 13.33±14.72 11.67±11.25 12.5±12.94
GP 15.83±16.25 2.5±4.18 9.17±8.76
This work 11.67±13.66 8.3±2.04 6.25±6.85
proposed approach on the OULU-NPU dataset (6.25 ± 6.85)
is better than other existing methods in spite of the fact that
all other methods in Table V use PA data for training. The
second best performing method on this dataset in terms of
ACER is FAS-BAS approach [3] with an ACER of 9.5± 6.0.
The GRADIANT method [68] with an ACER of 10.0 ± 5.0
represents the best performing method on the fourth protocol
of the OULU-NPU dataset in the ”Competition on Generalized
Software-based Face Presentation Attack Detection in Mobile
Scenarios” [68]. The proposed approach also performs better
than other kernel-based (SVDD, KPCA and GP) methods.
2) Replay-Attack: The results of a comparison between the
proposed approach and other methods in an unseen attack
detection scenario on the Replay-Attack dataset are presented
in Table VI. As it may be observed from the table, the
proposed approach achieves perfect detection performance on
this dataset (AUC=100%) while the best unseen face PAD
method from the literature obtains a detection performance of
99.8% in terms of AUC. The proposed method also performs
better than the SVDD approach while yielding a similar
performance as those of KPCA and GP which both benefit
from a similar multiple kernel fusion strategy.
Table VII presents a comparison between the state of the art
multi-class methods and the proposed approach on the Replay-
Attack dataset in terms of HTER. The proposed approach
achieves a zero HTER, outperforming the majority of multi-
class methods. The only method among others achieving a
zero HTER is that of [69].
3) MSU-MFSD: Table VIII presents a comparison between
the proposed approach and other methods operating in an
unseen scenario in terms of AUC. The following observations
may be made from the table. The purposed method performs
better than other existing face PAD methods, achieving a
perfect detection performance as compared to an AUC of 93%
for the DTL method [13]. Compared with SVDD, KPCA and
GP, the proposed solution performs better than SVDD, while
KPCA and GP, benefiting from a similar multiple kernel fusion
strategy, achieve a similar performance as that of the proposed
approach.
The results of a comparison between this work and the state
of the art multi-class methods in terms of EER are presented
TABLE VI: Comparison of the performance of the proposed
approach to some other methods on the Replay-Attack dataset
in an unseen attack scenario in terms of AUC (%).(SVDD,
KPCA and GP benefit from the same multiple kernel fusion
strategy as that of this work.)
Method AUC (%)
OCSVM+IMQ [8] 80.76
OCSVM+BSIF [8] 81.94
NN+LBP [39] 91.26
GMM+LBP [39] 90.06
OCSVM+LBP [39] 87.90
AE+LBP [39] 86.12
DTL [13] 99.80
SVDD 97.50
KPCA 100
GP 100
This work 100
TABLE VII: Comparison of the performance of proposed
approach to the state-of-the-art multi-class methods on the
Replay-Attack dataset in terms of HTER.
Method HTER(%)
Boulkenafet et al. [70] 2.90
lsCNN [28] 2.50
lsCNN Traditionally Trained [28] 1.75
Chingovska et al. [71] 6.29
Boulkenafet et al. [24] 3.50
LBP + GS-LBP [17] 3.13
Patch-based CNN [72] 1.25
Depth-based CNN [72] 0.75
Fusion of the two Patch and Depth CNNs [72] 0.72
Image Quality Assessment [73] 0.03
Deep Learning [69] 0
This work 0
in Table IX. As it may be observed from the table, the
proposed approach (achieving a perfect detection performance)
outperforms many multi-class methods. Among others, only
the RD method [51] provides a similar performance.
4) Replay-Mobile: A similar comparison as those on other
datasets is performed on the Replay-Mobile dataset. In an
unseen scenario, the results are reported in Table X and
compared against others in terms of HTER (HTER is chosen
for comparison as the majority of the existing unseen PAD
results on this dataset have reported their performances in
terms HTER). From the table, it may be observed that the
proposed approach betters better than other methods in an
unseen PAD scenario reported in the literature, achieving a
HTER of 13.64 compared to the best performing unseen
method of [40] with a HTER of 14.34. The proposed one-
class method also performs better than SVDD, KPCA and GP
approaches for face PAD in an unseen attack scenario.
A comparison of the proposed approach to the state of the
art multi-class methods is made in Table XI. As it may be
observed from the table, the proposed method performs better
than some other multi-class methods, yet performs inferior
compared to some multi-class techniques.
J. Summary of Performance Evaluations
Based on the evaluations conducted on four datasets, the
proposed approach, when compared to other methods operat-
ing in an unseen attack scenario (not using PA samples for
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TABLE VIII: Comparison of the performance of the proposed
approach to some other methods on the MSU-MFSD dataset
in an unseen attack scenario in terms of AUC. (SVDD, KPCA
and GP benefit from the same multiple kernel fusion strategy
as that of this work.)
Method AUC(%)
OCSVM+IMQ [8] 67.77
OCSVM+BSIF [8] 75.64
NN+LBP [39] 81.59
GMM+LBP [39] 81.34
OCSVM+LBP [39] 84.47
AE+LBP [39] 87.63
DTL [13] 93.00
SVDD 97.5
KPCA 100
GP 100
This work 100
TABLE IX: Comparison of the performance of proposed
approach to the state-of-the-art multi-class methods on the
MSU-MFSD dataset in terms of EER (%).
Method EER (%)
Texture analysis [70] 4.9
HSV+YCbCr fusion [74] 2.2
Multiscale Fusion [75] 6.9
IDA [63] 8.5
Colour LBP [24] 10.8
HRLF [76] 0.04
RD [51] 0.0
This work 0.0
training) obtains the-state-of-the-art performance. Moreover,
the performance of the proposed method is also very competi-
tive to the state-of-the-art multi-class methods. In this context,
on three out of four datasets, the proposed approach achieves
better or similar performance compared to methods that benefit
from PA training samples for training.
K. A Note on Inter-Dataset Evaluation
As discussed previously, one of the key contributions of the
present work is the introduction of class-specific modelling
for face PAD in the context of sparse one-class kernel fusion
regression. For this purpose, naturally, subject-specific data is
required to build client-specific classifiers. However, as there
is not overlap between subjects from different datasets, client-
specific approach prevents an inter-dataset evaluation. While
the cross-dataset evaluation is expected to be more challenging
than the intra-dataset evaluation, it should be noted that the
current study has addressed a different, and possibly more
challenging problem associated with the face PAD problem,
i.e. unseen attack detection. In this respect, the difficulties
associated with an inter-dataset evaluation attributed to, for
instance, different imaging sensors, different lighting condi-
tions, etc. are somewhat included in the experiments conducted
on different datasets such as OULU-NPU which naturally
incorporate such variations.
L. Observations
• In this study, the methodology was confined to utilising
only bona fide samples for training to investigate the
TABLE X: Comparison of the performance of the proposed
approach to some other methods on the Replay-Mobile dataset
in an unseen attack scenario in terms of HTER.(SVDD, KPCA
and GP benefit from the same multiple kernel fusion strategy
as that of this work.)
Method HTER (%)
GoogleNet+SVDD [40] 14.34
ResNet50+SVDD [40] 21.76
VGG16+SVDD [40] 18.78
GoogleNet+MD [40] 13.70
ResNet50+MD [40] 21.81
VGG16+MD [40] 19.84
GoogleNet+GMM [40] 14.21
ResNet50+GMM [40] 21.53
VGG16+GMM [40] 18.05
SVDD 16.14
KPCA 17.05
GP 16.36
This work 13.64
TABLE XI: Comparison of the performance of proposed
approach to the state-of-the-art multi-class methods on the
Replay-Mobile dataset in terms of HTER.
Method HTER
two-class SVM + LBP [9] 17.2
two-class SVM + Motion [9] 10.4
two-class SVM + Gabor [9] 9.13
two-class SVM + IQM [9] 4.10
This work 13.64
potential of a pure anomaly detection approach for face
PAD. Nevertheless, in the presence of attack samples for
training, further refinements to a one-class learner through
different mechanisms including a feature selection from
among deep CNN representations obtained from local
facial regions, a supervised multiple kernel learning ap-
proach to learn weights associated with different kernels,
etc. may be considered.
• A further observation corresponds to the Gaussianity
assumption made regarding bona fide score distributions
(Eq. 17). In practice, as observed from the results pre-
sented earlier, despite being a simplistic assumption, it
led to improvements in detection performance. How-
ever, a more suitable distribution model such as those
corresponding to Extreme Value Theory [77] may be
considered for improved modelling.
• A different observation corresponds to a general char-
acteristic of one-class learners. In a novelty detection
task where no information regarding anomaly samples is
accessible, it is challenging to set the decision thresholds.
A common practice in this case is to set the decision
threshold at a pre-specified confidence level such that
a small proportion of bona fide samples is rejected. In
the case of availability of a separate development set
specific for each subject, one would be able to set the
threshold such that a desired trade-off between FAR and
FRR is maintained. In the anomaly approach followed
in this work, the HTER corresponds to the confidence
level point closest to the EER setting. However, setting
the decision threshold in an OCC approach to ensure an
suitable practical performance remains an open problem,
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subject to future investigation.
• Finally, we note that training a one-class learner over
deep CNN representations may be viewed as a new CNN
model whose classification layers are constructed using
a one-class classifier, where for training, all network
parameters except the regression layers are freezed which
is considered to be a useful mechanism in the presence
of limited training samples.
VI. CONCLUSION
The paper addressed the face presentation attack detection
problem in the challenging conditions of an unseen attack
detection setting. For this purpose, a one-class novelty de-
tection approach, based on kernel regression, was presented.
Benefiting from generic deep CNN representations, additional
mechanisms including a multiple kernel fusion approach,
sparse regularisation of the regression solution, client-specific,
and probabilistic modelling were introduced to improve the
performance of the system. Experimental evaluation of the
proposed approach on four publicly available datasets in an
unseen face PAD setting illustrated that the proposed method
outperforms other methods operating in an unseen scenario
while competing closely with the state-of-the-art multi-class
methods. In the case of availability of PA training samples,
further improvements may be achieved by refining the solution
of a one-class learner through different mechanisms including
for instance a feature selection procedure, or multiple kernel
learning using multi-class training samples, etc. which are left
as future directions of investigation.
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